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I. INTRODUCTION
The circumstances surrounding death penalty cases in the United States
of America are not usually argued in the International Court of Justice (ICJ
or "the Court"), located in The Hague. The ICJ is not a human rights court,
nor is it a final court of criminal appeal. The Court's jurisdiction to hear
contentious disputes may only be invoked by states,' while its advisory ju-
risdiction is limited to giving opinions on legal questions asked by the Gen-
eral Assembly, the Security Council, or other organs and specialized agen-
cies of the United Nations that have been granted such a right Thus,
individuals, non-governmental organizations, and corporations cannot ap-
pear before the Court to argue violations of rights accorded by international
law.3
Despite these limitations to the ICJ's jurisdiction, twice in a period of
twelve months the United States confronted requests for interim protection
measures from nations arguing that the ICJ should order the delay of an
execution in America.' The first case involved Angel Francisco Breard, a
thirty-two year-old Paraguayan national found guilty of murder and sen-
" B.A., LL.B. (Melb.), LL.M. (Cantab.), Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Monash University.
The author wishes to thank Sarah Joseph for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
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1. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 59 Stat. T.S. No. 993, chap.
II, art. 34(1) (1945) ("Only States may be parties in cases before the Court.") [hereinafter
Statute of the ICJ].
2. See id. chap. IV, art. 65. See generally U.N. CHARTER art. 96, §§ 1-2.
3. See Stephen M. Schwebel, Human Rights in the World Court, 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 945, 946 (1991).
4. See International Court of Justice (last visited Mar. 15, 2001) <http://www.icj-cij.org>
(Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) and LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v.
U.S.)). See <http://www.icj-cij.org> for the full text of the applications, requests for provi-
sional measures, orders, pleadings, and judgments.
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tenced to death in Virginia (Breard).' The second application, Germany v.
United States (LaGrand),j concerned the trial and sentencing of a German
national, Walter LaGrand, in Arizona.7 In both cases it was alleged that the
United States breached its treaty obligations pursuant to the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations8 by failing to inform the two defendants of their
right to communicate with their respective consulates.9
Expediency was crucial in both cases-Paraguay instituted proceedings
nine days before Breard's scheduled execution."0 In the LaGrand case, Ger-
many filed its application for provisional measures in the Court's Registry
at The Hague hours before LaGrand's scheduled execution the next day."
Due to the urgency of each matter, Paraguay and Germany applied for pro-
visional measures to prevent the executions from taking place, as the merits
of the cases had not been heard.
Interim protection is defined as a suspensory remedy by which the ICJ
can ask "parties to a dispute before it to perform or to refrain from perform-
ing certain acts pending the settlement of the dispute at bar."'2 In recent
years, numerous requests for provisional measures have come before the
Court. 3 Such requests cover a variety of subjects, including the protection
of human rights. In such cases, states have resorted to applications for pro-
visional measures to prevent the ultimate in irreversible injury-the loss of
life. Traditional human rights law provides few binding options for provid-
ing immediate protection to a person in imminent danger,"' particularly
where a state is not a party to an individual communications procedure. This
is demonstrated by the fact that Paraguay and Germany brought urgent ap-
plications in a court designed to settle disputes between states, rather than in
a human rights institution, such as the Human Rights Committee.
5. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Memorial of the Repub-
lic of Paraguay, Oct. 9, 1998, 2.1, <http://www.icj-cij.org> [hereinafter Memorial of Para-
guay].
6. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Application of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Mar. 2, 1999, <http://www.icj-cij.org> [hereinafter Application of Germany].
7. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Memorial of the Republic of Germany, Sept. 19,
1999, 1.01 <http://www.icj-cij.org>.
8. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature Apr. 18, 1961, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into force Mar. 19, 1967).
9. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 249
(Interim Protection Order of Apr. 9) [hereinafter Paraguay]; LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.),
1999 I.C.J. 9, 10 (Interim Protection Order of Mar. 3) [hereinafter LaGrand].
10. Paraguay filed its application on April 3, 1988 and Breard's execution was scheduled
for April 14, 1998. See Paraguay, Application of the Republic of Paraguay, Apr. 3, 1998
<http://www.icj-cij.org> [hereinafter Application of Paraguay].
11. Germany filed its application on March 2, 1999 in The Hague and LaGrand's execu-
tion was scheduled for 3 p.m. MST the next day. See Application of Germany, supra note 6.
12. JEROME B. ELKIND, INTERIM PROTECTION-A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 3 (1981).
13. See International Court of Justice, supra note 4.
14. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, Provisional Measures in the American Human Rights System:
An Innovative Development in International Law, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 803, 806
(1993).
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 31, No. 1 [2000], Art. 24
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol31/iss1/24
2000] SAVING LIVES IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 143
While there are many interesting aspects of the Breard and LaGrand
cases that involve United States federal and state power over foreign rela-
tions and the status of the Vienna Convention in domestic law, the purpose
of this article is not to examine the place of treaty obligations in the United
States legal system. Instead the focus will be on the effectiveness of using a
request for provisional measures in the ICJ to protect the ultimate human
right-the right to life. Part II of this article examines the factual back-
ground and legal arguments behind Paraguay's and Germany's applications
to the ICJ, in the Breard and LaGrand cases (collectively the Vienna Con-
vention Cases). Part III considers the difficulties in using a request for pro-
visional measures to protect human life with regard to the purposes underly-
ing a grant of interim measures and the requirements for a successful
application. Finally, part IV examines the outcome of Breard and LaGrand
to determine whether the use of such procedures to protect human life is ap-
propriate considering the limitations imposed by the ICJ's Statute and juris-
prudence.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE CASES
A. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the
United States of America
The factual circumstances of Breard and LaGrand demonstrate the nu-
merous applications and lengthy delays that often accompany death penalty
cases in the United States. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extra-
judicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, recently
criticized the administration of the death penalty in the United States. Key
among his criticisms is that there is a significant degree of unfairness and
arbitrariness in its administration.'5 The detailed report expressed concern
about the execution of juveniles and mentally retarded persons. 6 Signifi-
cantly, the report alleged a lack of awareness amongst United States offi-
cials of their international obligations, at both the state and federal level. 7
For example, government officials and members of the judiciary at both the
state and federal level were ignorant of the fact that the U.S. was bound by
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).8 The U.S.
government had signed the treaty, but appears to have failed to disseminate
its terms, which effects both the federal government as well as individual
states. '9
15. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execu-
tions, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at §§ V(A)(148) &
(150), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.3 (1998) [hereinafter Executions Report].
16. See id. § V(A)(145).
17. See id. § V(A)(142).
18. See id.
19. See id.
3
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The ICCPR2" is particularly important in the context of death penalty
cases, as it states that "[elvery human being has the inherent right to life.
This right shall be protected by law [and] no one shall be arbitrarily de-
prived of his life."'" While this language would seem to give added protec-
tion to those on death row, the United States reserves the right, under Arti-
cle 6, "to impose capital punishment."' Nevertheless, international law
imposes a number of safeguards on the administration of the death penalty
not provided for by the laws of the several states and the federal govern-
ment. The "serious gap in the relations between [U.S.] federal and state
governments [regarding] international obligations undertaken by the U.S.
Government,"24 however, has prevented application of these additional safe-
guards. This is particularly troubling because typically state courts adminis-
ter the death penalty.
This gap is most evident with respect to the primary conventional obli-
gation contained in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna
Convention), 5 adopted in 1963 following the United Nations Conference on
Consular Relations. The Preamble states that all parties to the Vienna Con-
vention believe that "an international convention on consular relations,
privileges and immunities [will] contribute to the development of friendly
relations among nations, irrespective of their differing constitutional and so-
cial systems. 26 The primary function of the consulate and its consular offi-
cers is to represent nationals of a sending state and to attend to the needs of
20. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 3, 1976,
adopted by the United States Sept. 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR].
21. id. art. 6(1). See also Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, annex, 44
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), which entered into force July
11, 1991. "The State Parties to the present Protocol... shall take all necessary measures to
abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction." ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 1(2).
22. Executions Report, supra note 15, 28. "[T]he United States reserves the right, sub-ject to its constitutional constrains (sic), to impose capital punishment on any person (other
than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposi-
tion of capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age." United Nations Website Rights (last visited Mar. 19, 2001)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/partboo/ivboo/iv4.htmil#refBsD2300LAA
> (discussing International Convention on Civil and Political).
23. See ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 6(2).
In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the
time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the pre-
sent Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judge-
ment rendered by a competent court.
Id. art. 6(2).
24. Executions Report, supra note 15, 108.
25. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 8, art. 36.
26. Id. at Preamble.
4
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a sending state's nationals.27 It has been stated that a country's "right to
communicate and to have access to the nationals of the sending state is of
vital importance because the fulfillment of all other consular protective du-
ties depends on their exercise."28 The Convention outlines the relationship
between consular officials and the state to which they are posted, including
any immunities which may be enjoyed by consular officials, their commu-
nications, and their premises.29 At present, 163 states are parties to this Con-
vention.
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, which governs the consular com-
munication and contact with nationals of the sending state," is of particular
significance in Breard and LaGrand. The negotiations on Article 36 at the
United Nations Conference have been described as "so tortuous as to
threaten the successful conclusion of the Convention as a whole. 31 Under
the International Law Commission's Draft Convention, if a state detained a
foreign national the authorities of a receiving State had an unqualified obli-
gation to immediately inform the consuls of the detention of their nation-
als.32 However, a number of objections to this absolute provision were raised
during the Vienna Conference by delegates who were concerned about an
individual's liberty and ability to refuse consular assistance if it was not de-
sired.33 The final version of Article 36 is a compromise between these two
positions. Under the adopted version, consular officers have the right to visit
a national of a sending state who is detained in another country and to ar-
range for legal representation. 3 Further, if the detainee requests, Article 36
demands that state authorities notify a consulate that a national has been ar-
rested or is in custody.3" The relevant state authorities also must inform the
person concerned of these rights "without delay." '36 Importantly, Article
27. See id. art. 5(e), (i).
Consular functions consist in: ... (e) helping and assisting nationals, both indi-
viduals and bodies corporate, of the sending State [and,] (i)... representing or ar-
ranging appropriate representation for nationals of the sending State before the tri-
bunals and other authorities of the receiving State, for the purpose of obtaining...
provisional measures for the preservation of the rights and interests of these nation-
als, where ... such nationals are unable at the proper time to assume the defence
[sic] of their rights and interests.
Id.
28. Victor M. Uribe, Consuls at Work: Universal Instruments of Human Rights and Con-
sular Protection in the Context of Criminal Justice, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 375, 387 (1997).
29. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 8, chs. I-Il.
30. See id. art. 36.
31. LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 138 (2d ed. 1991).
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 8, art. 36(1)(c).
35. See id. art. 36(l)(b).
36. Id.
5
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36(2) provides that domestic laws must enable "full effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended."37
In essence, the protection Article 36 provides is crucial to the human
rights of nationals who are arrested and detained abroad. Depriving foreign
nationals of their liberty involves several basic human rights, including the
right to adequate legal representation, the right to due process, and the right
to an interpreter.38 Mark J. Kadish highlighted that Article 36 is an awkward
place to enumerate the rights of an individual national, as the preamble to
the Vienna Convention39 states that the purpose of the privileges and immu-
nities granted "is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient per-
formance of functions by consular posts."' This language "weigh[s] heavily
against an interpretation that the Treaty grants an individual right." 1 How-
ever, in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Teheran (Hostages),42 the United States argued that Article 36 not only
establishes rights for consular officers, but also for nationals of the sending
state who are assured access to such officials, and through them to others. 3
The failure by a state's authorities to comply with Article 36 has significant
human rights consequences, particularly with respect to the right to fair trial
guaranteed in the ICCPR."
Paradoxically, the United States "is both a leading champion and viola-
tor of the right to consular protection.' 4' For example, in 1973 the U.S. De-
partment of State noted that "Article 36 of the Vienna Convention contains
obligations of the highest order and should not be dealt with lightly."" In the
opinion of the Department, the obligation to inform a consular post of a na-
tional's detention, if the national so requests, should occur as soon as possi-
ble, and at the latest within the passage of a few days.47 The Department of
37. Id. art. 36(2).
38. See Uribe, supra note 28, at 376.
39. See Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A
Search for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565, 593 (1997). Specifically, if the re-
ceiving state detains a foreign national, it is required to immediately inform the consular post
of the national's sending state. See id. Further, it shall inform the detainee of all rights granted
under Article 36 and deliver any communication from the detainee to the sending state's con-
sular post. See id.
40. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 8, Preamble.
41. Kadish, supra note 39, at 593.
42. (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 7 (Dec. 15) [hereinafter Hostages]. See also Application of
the United States of America, 1979 I.C.J. 1 (Nov. 29).
43. See Memorial of the Government of the United States of America (U.S. v. Ian), 1980
I.C.J. Pleadings 121, 174 (Jan. 15) [hereinafter Memorial of the U.S.].
44. See Uribe, supra note 28, at 408 for a more detailed explanation of the relationship
between the obligations contained in Article 36 and international human rights law.
45. Gregory Dean Gisvold, Strangers in a Strange Land: Assessing the Fate of Foreign
Nationals Arrested in the United States by State and Local Authorities, 78 MINN. L. REV. 771,
803 (1994).
46. LEE, supra note 31, at 143 (1991) (quoting Department of State File LJMISCA; DEP'T
ST. DIGEST, 1973, at 161).
47. See id.
6
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State periodically sends notices to state and local officials reminding them
of their obligations under the Convention."8 The U.S. insists on the applica-
tion of this right in relation to American nationals abroad. 9 In contrast, the
United Nations Special Rapporteur has pointed to allegations that approxi-
mately sixty foreign nationals were sentenced to death in the U.S. without
having had the assistance of their consulate." Foreign criminal defendants
facing capital charges in U.S. state courts have recently raised violations of
Article 36 in habeas corpus petitions.5 Additionally, amicus briefs have
been filed by the foreign national's home state in such cases, and requests
for injunctive relief have been brought against the relevant United States
state officials. 2 Such challenges have been defeated in U.S courts on two
grounds. First, the Vienna Convention does not confer on an individual an
enforceable personal right. Second, a violation of Article 36 can only form
the basis of relief in a federal court if it has been raised in the state courts
below. 3 In response to such decisions, both Paraguay and Germany were
forced to apply for provisional measures before the ICJ.
B. The Breard Case54
Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan national, arrived in the U.S. in
1986 at age twenty. He was arrested and indicted in Virginia on September
1, 1992 on allegations of the attempted rape and murder of a Virginian
woman. Although the authorities involved were aware of his nationality,
they neglected to inform Breard of his right to consular assistance pursuant
to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.55 Furthermore, Paraguayan consular
officials were not informed of Breard's detention. It appeared that signifi-
cant problems for Breard were his language difficulties and his inability to
understand certain features of the U.S. justice system that were very differ-
ent than that of Paraguay. Against legal advice, he refused to plead guilty to
the prosecution's offer of a reduced sentence and instead insisted on con-
fessing on the stand as he believed that it would lead to greater jury leni-
ency. 6 On June 24, 1993, Breard was convicted of murder, and on August
48. See Kadish, supra note 39, at 599.
49. See Uribe, supra note 28, at 386-87.
50. See Executions Report, supra note 15, 118.
51. See e.g., Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F. 3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996); Miguel Angel Flores
v. Johnson, No. 99-40064 (5th Cir. 2000).
52. See Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F. 3d 515 (amicus curiae brief filed by Canadian govern-
ment). See also Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1272-73 (E.D. Va. 1996);
Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999).
53. See Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1263 (E.D. Va. 1996); Breard v.
Greene 523 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1998).
54. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), supra note 4, and ac-
companying text.
55. See Application of Paraguay, supra note 10.
56. See Memorial of Paraguay, supra note 5, 1 2.8. Breard believed that he had commit-
7
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22, he was sentenced to death. 7 Breard petitioned the court for relief via
writ of habeas corpus but was denied. He then appealed to the Supreme
Court of Virginia, which denied his petition for rehearing and appeal, thus
affirming the judgment. 8 His appeals were unsuccessful.
Paraguay first learned of Breard's conviction in 1996-three years after
sentencing. In 1996, Breard filed suit in federal district court, alleging his
rights under the Vienna Convention had been violated by the Common-
wealth of Virginia when it did not inform him of his right to contact the
Paraguayan consulate." This was the first time Breard introduced such an
argument, and it therefore failed. Separately, the Republic of Paraguay filed
suit in the federal district court claiming its own Article 36 rights had been
violated. This too failed on the basis that because there was not a continuing
violation of federal law, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.'
Finally, Breard petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
and submitted an application for a stay of execution.61 The case was heard
on April 14, 1998, the day scheduled for his execution. 2 At this stage, the
ICJ had also been seized of jurisdiction and had ordered the United States to
stay Breard's execution pending its final decision.' In the Supreme Court,
Breard argued that, although he had "procedurally defaulted his claim...
under the Vienna Convention by failing to raise [it] in the state courts .... ,"
the Vienna Convention, as the "supreme law of the land," trumps the proce-
dural default doctrine." The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the status
of treaties under the U.S. Constitution, disregarded this argument.6' Three
justices dissented on the basis that the Court should have had more time to
ted the crimes under a satanic curse, from which he was now freed. See id. He thought that if
the jury knew about the curse and his subsequent rebirth, they would understand that he was
not responsible for his actions and would find him not guilty. See id.
57. See id. at 260.
58. See id.
59. See Shana F. Marbury, Breard v. Green: International Human Rights and the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, 7 TUL. J. INTERNAT'L & COMP. L. 505, n. 11(1999).
60. See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269 (1996). See Shana F. Marbury,
supra note 59, for a detailed account of the appeals of Breard and Paraguay in the U.S. See
also Jonathan I. Charney & Michael Reisman, Breard-The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666
(1998).
61. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 377.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 374.
64. Id. at 375.
65. See id. at 375-77. The Supreme Court found that
[elven were Breard's Vienna Convention claim properly raised and proven, it is ex-
tremely doubtful that the violation should result in the overturning of a final judg-
ment of conviction without some showing that the violation had an effect on the
trial... [N]o such showing could even arguably be made [in this case].
Id. at 377.
8
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consider its opinion." The Supreme Court delivered its decision a mere
thirty-eight minutes prior to the scheduled time for Breard's execution.67
Although the Supreme Court denied Breard's application, it acknowl-
edged that the Executive Branch, "in exercising its authority over foreign
relations may, and in this case did, utilize diplomatic discussions with Para-
guay."'68 In fact, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had already asked
Virginia Governor James Gilmore, to stay the executions due to the harm it
might cause to Americans "accused of crimes in foreign countries."7
"[C]oncerned about the possible negative consequences for the many U.S.
citizens who live and travel abroad,"7' she sought to protect reciprocity to
ensure that American citizens would be accorded their rights if they found
themselves in trouble.72 However, the governor failed to act on these pleas."
Instead, Breard was executed by lethal injection and was pronounced dead
at 10:39 p.m. E.S.T. on April 14, 1998.' 4
C. The LaGrand Case"
The LaGrand case followed a similar procedural matrix to that of
Breard. Karl and Walter LaGrand, brothers and German nationals, were
convicted of the murder of a bank manager, the attempted murder of a bank
employee, and the kidnapping of the two during an attempted bank robbery
in Arizona in 1982.6 They were sentenced to death for the murder of the
bank manager.77 Despite diplomatic interventions on the part of the German
government, Karl LaGrand was executed in February 1999.8 His brother's
execution was scheduled for March 3, 1999."' With only months to Walter
LaGrand's scheduled execution, the German consular officers finally be-
came aware of the LaGrand's situation."
66. See id. at 379-81 (dissenting opinions of Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ.).
67. See Brooke A. Masters & Joan Biskupic, Killer Executed Despite Pleas: World Tri-
bunal, State Department Had Urged Delay, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1998, at B1.
68. Breard, 523 U.S. at 378.
69. See Letter from Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, to James Gilmore, the
governor of Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998).
70. Masters & Biskupic, supra note 67, at B 1.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See Application of Germany, supra note 6.
76. See Arizona v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 565 (1987).
77. See id.
78. See Application of Germany, supra note 6, pt. II, 8.
79. See id.
80. See id. 4.
9
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It was not disputed that the Arizona authorities had deprived the La-
Grands of their rights under the Vienna Convention."' In 1995, the LaGrands
petitioned for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona, basing their petition on ineffective assistance of counsel." In 1998,
the LaGrands appealed, claiming a violation of their Vienna Convention
rights. They argued that the failure to notify them of the their right to con-
tact the German consulate precluded any opportunity to gather exculpatory
or mitigating evidence relating to their abusive childhood and the difficul-
ties children of mixed marriages face in Germany.83 However, as in the
Breard case, LaGrand's appeal in federal court failed on procedural grounds
because the issue had not been raised at the state level.8
Germany claimed that it did not become fully aware of the facts of the
case until February 24, 1999, and from that date it pursued its action on a
diplomatic level. 5 Despite a recommendation from the Board of Executive
Clemency in Arizona for a reprieve for Walter LaGrand, the governor of
Arizona, Jane Dee Hull, decided to allow the execution to proceed after
consultations with the German Ambassador, the Attorney-General and one
of the victims of LaGrand' s crime. 6
D. The Applications Before the International Court of Justice
While these actions were being pursued in the domestic courts, Para-
guay and Germany initiated separate actions in the International Court of
Justice claiming that the U.S. had breached its treaty obligations pursuant to
the Vienna Convention. 7 In both cases, the Court had jurisdiction pursuant
to the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.8 Article I of the Proto-
col provides that, "[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application
of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by
an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present
Protocol."89 In Breard, Paraguay asked the Court to declare the U.S. was un-
81. See id. 15.
82. See LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 451 (D. Ariz. 1995) and 883 F. Supp. 469 (D.
Ariz. 1995), affirmed LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998).
83. See LaGrand, 133 F.3d at 1262.
84. See LaGrand v. Stewart, 170 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Application of
Germany, supra note 6, pt. II, 7.
85. See Application of Germany, supra note 6, pt. III, 9.
86. See Governor Jane Dee Hull, Statement on the Case of Walter LaGrand (Mar. 2,
1999).
87. See Application of Paraguay, supra note 10; Application of Germany, supra note 6.
88. See Optional Protocol to the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Con-
ceming the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 (entered
into force Mar. 19, 1967).
89. Id. art. I.
10
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der an international legal obligation not to apply the domestic doctrine of
procedural default, which precludes the exercise of a foreign national's Vi-
enna Convention rights." Under the law of treaties, a state cannot invoke its
domestic law to justify the failure to perform a treaty obligation.91 In addi-
tion, Paraguay requested the following declarations from the Court: (1) any
criminal liability imposed on Breard in violation of the United States' inter-
national obligations is void, (2) the United States should "re-establish the
situation that existed before the detention" and proceedings against Breard,
and (3) "the United States should provide Paraguay with a guarantee of non-
repetition of the illegal acts." Germany claimed similar remedies in its ap-
plication and, additionally, requested reparation in the form of compensa-
tion from the U.S. for the execution of Karl LaGrand.93 Due to the immi-
nence of the death sentences, Paraguay and Germany requested provisional
measures to prevent the executions from taking place before the merits of
their substantive applications were heard. 4 The extreme urgency of Ger-
many's request was clear by its reliance on Article 75(1) of the Rules of
Court, which enables the ICJ to indicate provisional measures proprio
motu.
95
While the two applications were phrased in terms of damage to both the
states and their nationals, the nationals' rights were paramount. The impor-
tance of the nationals' lives in these cases is suggested by the invocation of
the right to life in the applications, and confirmed by Paraguay's withdrawal
of the case from the Court following Breard's execution.96 Given the varied
nature of the rights the applicant states were attempting to enforce, the issue
arises as to the extent to which provisional measures in the ICJ are an effec-
tive means of protecting people rather than states. The problems inherent in
the use of a request for provisional measures to protect human rights will be
examined in the next section in the context of the Statute of the Court and
its case law.
90. See Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 250.
91. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 115 U.N.T.S.
331. "A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty." Id.
92. Application of Paraguay, supra note 10, 25.
93. See Application of Germany, supra note 6, 1 15.
94. See Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 251; LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. at 12.
95. See LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. at 13; International Court of Justice Rules of Court (1978),
(last amended Dec. 5, 2000) <http:www//icj-cij.org> [hereinafter ICJ Rules of Court].
96. See Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 426 (Discontinuance Order of Nov. 10).
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III. PROVISIONAL MEASURES AND PROTECTION OF LIFE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
A. The Statute and the Rules of Court
Municipal courts throughout the world can order provisional measures
to preserve the rights of the parties pending a final determination of the dis-
pute. Similarly, in the area of international law, courts and tribunals can or-
der provisional measures.' However, the position at the international level
is somewhat complicated by the fact that the parties involved are sovereign
nations, as opposed to individuals. The ICJ's power to grant an order of in-
terim measures is located in Article 41 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (the Statute).98 Article 41 provides that:
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circum-
stances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to
preserve the respective rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forth-
with be given to the parties and to the Security Council.
Article 41 of the Statute is derived from its predecessor, the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)."8 While a few minor
alterations were made in the revision of the Statute reflecting the creation of
the United Nations, the substance of Article 41 was not affected.' The 1978
Revised Rules of Court elaborate on the Court's power to grant interim
measures in Articles 73 through 78, section D, "Incidental Proceedings" (as
opposed to mainline jurisdiction)." The description of provisional measures
as "incidental" to the main proceedings logically implies that the Court has
jurisdiction over the matter and that there is a connection between the re-
quested interim protection and subject matter of the underlying dispute. 3 In
97. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for signature
Nov. 23, 1957, 1958 U.N.T.S. 11. "The [European] Court of Justice may, in any cases referred
to it, make any necessary interim order." Id. art. 186. See also American Convention on Hu-
man Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," Nov. 22, 1969, 1979 U.N.T.S. 123. "In cases of
extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons" the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has the ability to grant provisional measures. Id. art.
63(2).
98. See Statute of the ICJ, supra note 1, art. 41.
99. Id.
100. See Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Dec. 16, 1920, 6
L.N.T.S. 390.
101. See JERZY SZTUCKI, INTERIM MEAsuREs IN TE HAGUE COURT-AN ATTEMPr AT A
SCRUTINY 27 (Netherlands, Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers 1983). "The present Article 41
differs from the original text only in that... the words 'Security Council' are substituted for
the 'Council'." Id. at 28
102. ICJ Rules of Court, supra note 95, § D(l), arts. 73-78.
103. [3 Procedure] SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
12
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the past, the Court has invoked Article 41 to grant interim protection meas-
ures in a diverse range of circumstances, including requests that states re-
frain from conducting atmospheric nuclear tests,104 the release of hostages,'
and efforts to prevent and punish the crime of genocide.'" Any orders for
provisional measures must be communicated to the Secretary General of the
United Nations, which in turn are transmitted to the Security Council." This
does not imply that the Security Council will automatically consider the
matter, as the agenda of the Security Council is governed by its own rules of
procedure.'
B. Purpose of Provisional Measures
When considering cases brought to protect human rights-particularly
the right to life-Article 41 poses two initial questions regarding the objec-
tives underlying a grant of provisional measures. First, who may apply for
such measures, and second, what is the purpose behind an order for interim
protection? The objective of provisional measures under Article 41 is to
preserve the rights of "either party"'" to a case; "party" meaning state. A
state may bring a case before the ICJ in two situations; first if its own rights
have been violated or second, if it wishes to protect the rights of one of its
nationals via a grant of diplomatic protection. In the latter case, it is a well
recognized principle that "a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when in-
jured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from
whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary
channels.""' Thus the question arises whether an order for provisional
measures can extend to protecting the rights of the individual national;
whether the state is bringing the claim on its own behalf or via its right of
COURT, 1920-1996, 1424 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2d ed. 1997).
104. See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 99 (June 22); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v.
Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 135 (June 22).
105. See Hostages, 1979 I.C.J. at 7.
106. See Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)) 1993 I.C.J.
3 (April 8); Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro))
1993 I.C.J 325 (Sept. 13).
107. See ICJ Rules of Court, supra note 95, art. 77.
108. See 3 RosENmN, supra note 103, at 1459. As of 1997,
the Security Council has only once taken on its agenda the question of compliance
with an order indicating provisional measures [and] [tlhat was in 1951... If, how-
ever, the provisional measures are indicated in a case relating to a matter already
on the Security Council's agenda, the Security Council may adopt a resolution
concerning compliance with them without further action regarding its agenda.
Id. at 1459-60.
109. Statute of the ICJ, supra note 1, art. 41.
110. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2,
at 12 (Aug. 30) [hereinafter Palestine Concessions].
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diplomatic protection for the national. The answer to this question requires
an understanding of the purpose behind an order for provisional measures.
Article 41 emphasizes that provisional measures are designed to "pre-
serve" rights."' International legal scholars have commented that the func-
tion of interim protection is "to safeguard the rights which are in dispute,
pending the Court's decision on the merits."'"2 Such a broad interpretation
suggests that the object of provisional measures could be manifold: to pre-
serve the rights of the state parties (as stated in Article 41),' to maintain the
"status quo,"" 4 "to promote the satisfactory conduct of the proceedings,"" 5
and to "ensure that no action is taken which might aggravate or extend the
dispute.""' 6 While the first stated purpose clearly focuses on the rights of a
state as a party, the remaining objectives could be more widely construed to
include the protection of an individual. These purposes will be examined in
the context of the rights provisional measures can protect as well as the pro-
hibition against using such applications as a means of obtaining an interim
judgment.
1. Rights that May be Protected
Rights protected by the provisional measures must clearly be the same
as those forming the basis of the main dispute before the Court. The PCIJ, in
the Polish Agrarian Reform Case, emphasized that "the essential condition
which must necessarily be fulfilled in order to justify a request for the indi-
cation of interim measures. . . is that such measures should have the effect
of protecting the rights forming the subject of the dispute submitted to the
Court.""' More recently, the ICJ has reiterated this condition in the Case
Concerning the Passage through the Great Belt,"s stating that "it is the pur-
pose of provisional measures to preserve 'rights which are the subject of
dispute in judicial proceedings.""'9 The possibility of subsidiary rights be-
ing protected was rejected in the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 Case,2
111. Statute of the ICJ, supra note 1, art. 41.
112. J.G. Merrills, Interim Measures of Protection in the Recent Jurisprudence of the In-
ternational Court of Justice, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 90, 100 (1995) [hereinafter Merrills, Re-
cent Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice].
113. See SZTuCKi, supra note 101, at 70.
114. Id. at 72.
115. Id. at 73 (quoting Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.) 1976 I.C.J.
3 (Sept. 11)).
116. Id. at 74 (quoting Nuclear Tests (Austr. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. at 106).
117. Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1933 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 58, at 177 (July 29).
118. (Fin. v. Den.) 1991 I.C.J. 12 (July 29).
119. Id. at 17 (quoting Hostages, 1979 I.C.J. at 19).
120. (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.) 1990 I.C.J. 64, 69-70 (Mar. 2). The main dispute concerned
the validity of an arbitral award, rather than any dispute over the maritime territory with which
the award was concerned. See id. at 64. However, Guinea-Bissau requested an interim order
that the parties refrain from all acts in the disputed maritime territory that was the subject of
14
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which concerned the validity of an arbitral decision between Guinea-Bissau
and Senegal.
Accordingly, the Court in the Vienna Convention Cases reaffirmed the
requirement of "coincidence": "[T]he Court must be concerned to preserve
by such measures the rights which may subsequently be adjudged by the
Court to belong either to the Applicant, or to the Respondent.. ., The
treatment of this requirement, however, was complicated by the applications
before the Court. Both Paraguay and Germany indicated their entitlement to
a remedy from the ICJ on the basis that the United States had violated inter-
national legal obligations the United States owed to Paraguay and Germany
both, "in [their] own right and in the exercise of [their] right of diplomatic
protection of [their] nationalls].' Paraguay reiterated this in its Request
for the Indication of Provisional Measures, filed concurrently with its appli-
cation."3 This distinction between the rights of a state and the rights of its
nationals should not affect the ICJ's ability to grant provisional measures to
protect nationals. According to international law, once a state exercises dip-
lomatic protection, the state is the "sole claimant" in the eyes of the interna-
tional tribunal. 2 ' As Michael K. Addo has commented, "[d]iplomatic
protection has to take account of the developments in international human
rights law." '125
While Paraguay and Germany argued for new trials,"6 the United States
viewed the reparation of violations of the Vienna Convention quite differ-
ently. Counsel for the United States, during oral proceedings in Breard, ac-
knowledged that Article 36 required and that Virginia authorities failed to
notify Breard of his Vienna Convention rights.'27 However, according to
counsel for the United States, "the solution to such a breach of the treaty's
requirements is to be pursued through normal processes of diplomatic apol-
ogy, consultation and improved implementation."'28 At that time, senior U.S.
the arbitral award. See id. at 65. On the basis that the rights sought to be made the subject of
the provisional measures were not the same as the rights in dispute on the merits, the Court
rejected Guinea-Bissau's request. See id. at 84.
121. Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 257; LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. at 14-15.
122. Application of Paraguay, supra note 10, 25. See also Application of Germany, su-
pra note 6, 1 15.
123. See Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 249-50.
124. See Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J. at 12.
125. Michael K. Addo, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United
States of America) ("Breard") and LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Applica-
tions for Provisional Measures, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 673, 680 (1999) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations].
126. See International Court of Justice (last visited Mar. 15, 2001) <http://www.icj-
cij.org> (Paraguay, Oral Pleadings of Paraguay of Apr. 7, 1998, 1.8 [hereinafter Oral Plead-
ings (Para.)]; LaGrand, Oral Pleadings of Germany of Nov. 11, 2000, 37 [hereinafter Oral
Pleadings (F.R.G.)]).
127. See id. (Paraguay, Oral Pleadings of United States of Apr. 7, 1998, 2.6 [hereinaf-
ter Oral Pleadings (U.S.)]).
128. Oral Pleadings (U.S.), 3.19.
15
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officials had already conveyed such an apology to the Republic of Para-
guay.129 Furthermore, the United States argued that the Vienna Convention
protected only Paraguay's rights as a nation, not Breard's rights as an indi-
vidual. Therefore, it was inappropriate to set aside Breard's conviction as a
remedy for the breach of Paraguay's rights. In sum, under the United States'
view the right to consular assistance pursuant to Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention belongs only to the sending state rather than to the individual
accused of a crime. The grant of Paraguay's requested provisional measures
(to set aside Breard's conviction), therefore, would not aid in the preserva-
tion of the rights within the meaning of Article 41 of the Statute. This illus-
trates a divergence in the interpretation of the rights granted pursuant to the
Vienna Convention.
The divergence of opinion on the rights that formed the basis of the
claim between Paraguay and the United States raises the question: what do a
sovereign state's "rights" encompass according to Article 41 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice? Proceedings such as the Frontier Dis-
pute '3 and the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua),3' illustrate that a state's sovereign rights
are clearly affected in relation to territorial matters. What is less clear is
whether persons, in particular nationals, can also be protected via a grant of
interim measures, which was the effect of the two orders in the Vienna Con-
vention Cases.
In Nicaragua, the applicant claimed that "the rights of Nicaraguan citi-
zens to life, liberty and security" needed to be preserved."2 The Court did
not specifically comment on this point, and instead dealt with the United
States' claim that Nicaragua's application would impede the Contadora
process."' In its final order the Court never specifically referred to the Nica-
raguan's right to life, but it did require that both the United States and Nica-
ragua ensure that no action would be taken which would prejudice the rights
of either party." In an order for provisional measures made only two years
later, a Chamber of the Court in the Frontier Dispute, dealt with this issue.
The Chamber found a serious risk of irreparable prejudice to persons and
property as well as the interests of both States on the facts and ordered pro-
visional measures of protection. 3' Again, in the application for provisional
measures in another territorial dispute, the Land and Maritime Boundary be-
tween Cameroon and Nigeria case,"6 the Court indicated that the sovereign
rights at issue also concerned persons, yet, the Court was concerned with the
129. See id. 13.18.
130. (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 3 (Jan. 10) [hereinafter Frontier Dispute].
131. (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 169 (May 10).
132. Id. at 182.
133. See id. at 183.
134. See id. at 187.
135. See Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. at 10.
136. (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1996 I.C.J. 13, 22 (Mar. 15).
16
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lives of citizens in general, rather than identifiable individuals. Rosalyn
Higgins suggests that these two cases represent a more radical approach in
the Court's jurisprudence; although the disputes were about territory, the
Court nonetheless adjudicated on the rights of people.'37 They demonstrate
that the Court has accepted its ability to protect human life via a grant of
provisional measures, at least where other sovereign rights are also at issue.
Additional support for the Court's power directly to protect human life
can be found in the applications for provisional measures in the Hostages
case 38 and the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide Case (Application of the Genocide Con-
vention). 3 In the Hostages case, the United States initiated suit in the ICJ
following the seizure of its embassy and diplomatic staff in Teheran by Ira-
nian student protesters in 1979." Two of the hostages were not diplomatic
officials but were private persons who were present in the embassy at the
time it was overrun by the students. 4' The U.S. argued that provisional
measures were necessary to protect "the rights of its nationals to life, lib-
erty, protection and security."'4 2 The Court subsequently ordered that "Iran
should ensure the immediate release, without any exception, of all persons
of United States nationality who are or have been held in the [U.S.] Em-
bassy."'"3 The threat of death to United States citizens, most of whom the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations protected, was perceived as a
potential injury to the U.S. and thus capable of being redressed under inter-
national law. While it is clear that the diplomats and consular officials had
immunity under the two Vienna Conventions,'" the Court here made no dis-
tinction between diplomatic and private persons in the Order. 43 The Court
found that the violation of the rights of the two private American nationals
fell within the scope of Article 5 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Re-
lations.'" Thirlway notes that the Court "moved imperceptibly from the in-
137. See Rosalyn Higgins, Interim Measures for the Protection of Human Rights, in Poli-
tics, Values and Functions-International Law in the 21" Century, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
PROFESSOR Louts HENKIN 101 (Jonathan I. Chamey et al. eds. 1997).
138. See Hostages, 1979 I.C.J. at 7.
139. (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.) (Application of Mar. 20), International Court of Justice
(visited Mar. 6, 2001) <http://www.icj-cij.org>.
140. See Hostages, 1979 I.C.J. at 17-18.
141. See id. at 14.
142. Id. at 19.
143. Id. at 21.
144. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 14, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95
(entered into force Apr. 24, 1964). "The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He
shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention." Id. art. 29. See also Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, supra note 8, art. 41(1), which states that "Consular officials shall not
be liable to arrest or detention pending trial, except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant
to a decision by the competent judicial authority."
145. See Hostages, 1979 I.C.J. at 21.
146. See id. at 14.
17
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temational legal rights of the United States to the injury to the persons,
health and life of the individuals concerned." 47
Perhaps the clearest indication of the Court's ability to protect human
life is its Order at the provisional measures stage in the Application of the
Genocide Convention.'" Bosnia and Herzegovina requested a number of
provisional measures of the Court, including the cessation of "all acts of
genocide and genocidal acts against the People and State of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, including but not limited to murder; summary executions; tor-
ture; rape; mayhem; [and] so-called 'ethnic cleansing."" 9 While the Court
did not accede to all elements of Bosnia's request it did order that the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia should "take all measures within its power to
prevent the commission of the crime of genocide." ' Thus the Order, citing
the Genocide Convention, specifically protected human life in the territory
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In the Vienna Convention Cases, the applicant states phrased their re-
quests in terms of the need to protect the lives of their nationals, in order
that the remedy of restitution could be ordered on the merits.' However,
unlike the Genocide Convention, there is some dispute as to whether Article
36 of the Vienna Convention is phrased in terms of protecting, specifically,
human life. Kadish argues that the drafters of the Vienna Convention in-
tended to create an individual private right, and that the remedy for breach-
ing this treaty obligation would be a return to the status quo ante, including
the reversal of a criminal conviction and new trial. 52 However, this does not
necessarily translate into a state's right to utilize the ICJ to uphold this right
and delay a death sentence. Previously the United States has argued that Ar-
ticle 36 does protect the right of nationals of the sending State to have ac-
cess to consular officers."3 In the Vienna Convention Cases, the Court
agreed with the applicants' interpretation of a paramount interest in the life
and liberty of their respective nationals, without considering whether the
Vienna Convention did in fact enunciate an obligation to protect such a
right.' As in the Hostages case,' the Court implicitly acknowledged that
147. H.W.A. Thirlway, The Indication of Provisional Measures by the International
Court of Justice, in INTERIM MEASURES INDICATED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS 9 (Rudolph
Bernhardt ed., 1994).
148. See Application of the Genocide Convention, 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Interim Protection Or-
der of Apr. 8).
149. Id. at 8.
150. Id. at 24.
151. See International Court of Justice, (last visited Mar. 15, 2001) <http://www.icj-
cij.org> (Paraguay, Request of the Republic of Paraguay, Apr. 3, 1998, 7 [hereinafter Re-
quest of Paraguay]; LaGrand, Request of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mar. 2, 1999, 7
[hereinafter Request of Germany]).
152. See Kadish, supra note 39, 610-12.
153. See Memorial of the U.S., supra note 43, at 174.
154. See Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 257; LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. at 12-16.
155. See Hostages, 1979 I.C.J. 7.
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the legal rights of the applicant states could be harmed by a threat to the
lives of their nationals." 6 If the Court, on the merits of Germany's applica-
tion, affirms this interpretation of the Vienna Convention, it will signifi-
cantly expand the ability of states to use the ICJ as a court of human rights.
While the majority of the Court did not consider this issue in detail dur-
ing the request for provisional measures, Judge Oda, in a separate opinion,
dealt with the point more fully. Due to the urgency of the situation, Judge
Oda voted for the Court's order in both cases "for humanitarian reasons,"
while simultaneously expressing disquiet regarding the extent to which a
stay of execution would protect the rights of Paraguay and Germany under
the Vienna Convention."7 Regarding the Breard case, he believed that Para-
guay's rights as a state (as distinct from Breard's rights as an individual)
were not exposed to an imminent irreparable breach such that could be
remedied by the grant of provisional measures."8 In LaGrand, Judge Oda
went a step further and stated:
If the Court intervenes directly in the fate of an individual, this would
mean some departure from the function of the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations, which is essentially a tribunal set up to settle inter-
State disputes concerning the rights and duties of States. I fervently hope
that this case will not set a precedent in the history of the Court .... I can-
not condone the use of the Court for such matters as the above under the
pretext of the protection of human rights.5 9
Judge Oda keenly perceived the problem that the Court faced. The ICJ
has frequently referred to international human rights principles in its conten-
tious cases and advisory opinions. In these two orders the Court has gone
one step further by assuming first, the existence of an individual right vested
in the Vienna Convention for the purpose of provisional measures, and sec-
ond, that one potential method of remedying a breach of that right would be
to stay an execution. Legal scholars have commented that Judge Oda is
"swimming against the tide because the LaGrand and Breard cases are a
predictable and.., justifiable development from the [Hostages case and the
Application of the Genocide Convention case]. '' "6 While the two orders in
the Vienna Convention Cases represent a justifiable development in the
ICJ's jurisprudence, the United States' lack of compliance with such orders
indicates that the utility of orders for provisional measures as a means of
protecting human rights, as distinct from states' rights, must be questioned.
156. See Paraguay, I.C.J. at 257-58; LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. at 15.
157. See Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 260-62 (separate opinion of Judge Oda); LaGrand,
1999 I.C.J. at 18-20 (separate opinion of Judge Oda).
158. See Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 261 (separate opinion of Judge Oda).
159. LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. at 19-20 (separate opinion of Judge Oda).
160. Addo, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 125, at 680.
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2. An Interim Judgment?
Judge Oda's final objection to the orders in the Vienna Convention
Cases was that applicants should not use requests for provisional measures
for the purpose of obtaining interim judgment, in effect predetermining the
main dispute."' The order for provisional measures in Application of the
Genocide Convention also highlighted the distinction between a legitimate
request for provisional measures and an attempt to obtain an interim judg-
ment, which is beyond the power granted to the Court in Article 41 of the
Statute of the ICJ. Yugoslavia argued that Bosnia was in fact asking the
Court for an interim judgment on the merits of the case, which would essen-
tially prejudge the dispute at the provisional measures stage.62 While the
Court agreed that it could not make a definitive finding of fact on Yugosla-
via's responsibility for the alleged genocide, it did order provisional meas-
ures, taking into consideration the grave risk of aggravating or extending the
dispute." 3
Commentators note a trend in the last twenty years "for proceedings to
be instituted before the Court in circumstances suggesting that the intention
was less to obtain a judgment on the merits than to obtain the short-term
tactical advantage of an order indicating provisional measures."'" This trend
has been criticized. 65 The Nuclear Tests cases,'6 where Australia and New
Zealand requested provisional measures, as well as the United States' re-
161. See Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 261 (separate opinion of Judge Oda); LaGrand Case,
1999 I.C.J. at 19 (separate opinion of Judge Oda).
162. See Application of the Genocide Convention, 1993 I.C.J. at 21. Yugoslavia based its
argument on the Permanent Court of International Justice's order in the Case Concerning the
Factory at Chorz6w. Id. There the Court held that a request for advance payment in part satis-
faction of the primary claim was not a request for provisional measures, but rather was "de-
signed to obtain an interim judgment in favour of a part of the claim formulated in the Appli-
cation." Factory at Chorz6w (F.R.G. v. Pol.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A), No. 12, at 10 (Nov. 21).
163. See Application of the Genocide Convention, 1993 I.C.J. at 23.
164. Thirlway, supra note 147, at 27.
165. See Shigeru Oda, Provisional Measures-The Practice of the International Court of
Justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE-ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR
ROBERT JENNINGS 541, 554 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996). Oda stated,
"It is my view that proceedings on provisional measures must essentially constitute a type of
proceeding incidental to, not coincidental with, the proceedings on the merits of such conten-
tious disputes as fall within the jurisdiction of the Court." Id.
166. (Austr. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99; (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 135. At the interim protec-
tion stage of the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia asked the Court to order France to "desist from
any further atmospheric nuclear tests pending the judgment of the Court." (Austr. v. Fr.), 1973
I.C.J. at 100. Similarly, New Zealand asked the Court to order France to "refrain from con-
ducting any further nuclear tests that give rise to radio-active fall-out while the Court is seized
of the case." (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. at 136. Both Australia and New Zealand's main claim
was that France should desist from all atmospheric testing. Judges Forster and Gros dissented
from the Court's order for interim protection stating that only by a final judgment could the
Court order the cessation of French nuclear testing. See (Austr. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. at 113
(Forster, J., dissenting); (N.Z. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. at 123; (Austr. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. at 158
(Gros, J., dissenting).
20
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 31, No. 1 [2000], Art. 24
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol31/iss1/24
2000] SAVING LIVES IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 161
quest for provisional measures in the Hostages case, 167 exemplify the trend.
In the Hostages case the United States, in both the request for interim meas-
ures and its main application, asked the Court to order Iran to release the
hostages. 168 Commenting on the coincidence between the two applications,
the Court held that "the purpose of the United States request ... [was] not to
obtain a judgment, interim or final, on the merits of its claim but to preserve
the substance of the rights which it claim[ed] pendente lite. '' "9 Indeed, the
Court emphasized that "a request for provisional measures must by its very
nature relate to the substance of the case since, as Article 41 expressly
states, their object is to preserve the respective rights of either party [in-
volved].
In Breard, the United States, as respondent, utilized the same argument
made against it in the Hostages case. In oral argument, counsel for the
United States argued that "provisional measures should not be indicated in
terms or in circumstances where they constitute a disguised adjudication on
the merits.' '7 Counsel stated that,
[i]f the measures sought by Paraguay are indicated and implemented,
Paraguay will have won, at least for a period of however many years may
be required for the Court to arrive with its final judgment. Paraguay will
have advanced its key objective through a hurried and unbalanced proceed-
ing that cannot adequately address the serious legal issues that are at
stake. 172
In response, Paraguay emphasized that its request for provisional meas-
ures was extremely narrow and that if the United States prevailed on the
merits Virginia could schedule a new execution date."' Both Paraguay and
Germany, in their requests for provisional measures highlighted that if the
executions went ahead they would be denied the opportunity to have the
status quo ante restored in the event of a judgment in their favor.,74 It is cer-
tainly true that if the Court did ultimately find in favor of the applicants, the
execution of Breard and LaGrand has cancelled out the possibility of a rem-
edy based on restitution. On this basis, the Vienna Convention Cases can be
distinguished from suggestions made in earlier decisions that a coincidence
of remedies in the applications for provisional measures and on the merits
may contain hints of a disguised interim judgment.
167. See Hostages, 1979 I.C.J. at 7.
168. See id. at 8; Hostages, 1979 I.C.J. Pleadings 1, at 6 (Nov. 29).
169. Hostages, 1979 I.C.J. at 16.
170. Id.
171. Oral Pleadings (U.S.), supra note 127, 1 3.36.
172. Id. 13.34.
173. See Oral Pleadings (Para.), supra note 126 (argument of Ambassador Manuel Maria
Caceres).
174. See Request of Paraguay, supra note 151, 7; Request of Germany, supra note 151,
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The fact that Paraguay withdrew its case against the United States sub-
sequent to Breard's execution may suggest that Paraguay was merely pursu-
ing an interim judgment. Certainly Paraguay did not pursue its claim for a
guarantee from the United States of non-repetition of the allegedly illegal
acts. The result in Breard adds credence to Judge Oda's suggestion that in
such cases a solution should be arrived at via an expeditious proceeding on
the merits, rather than through an application for provisional measures.'75 A
discussion of the efficacy of ICJ proceedings and areas for potential reform
has been attempted elsewhere but is beyond the scope of this article.76 It is
enough to note that given the impending death sentences and the extremely
lengthy process involved in ICJ merits deliberations, it would have been un-
realistic for Paraguay or Germany to pursue any other course of action to
obtain the remedy sought. The urgency of the situation, combined with the
possibility that a potential remedy could not be ordered resulted in orders
favoring the applicant states, thus ensuring the international legal protection
of two men on death row in the United States. These factors will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
C. Requirements for a Grant of Interim Measures
The ICJ has identified three main requirements for the indication of
provisional measures: (1) a prima facie demonstration of jurisdiction, (2) the
risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights of either party, and (3) urgency. "7
At times, other suggestions have been added, such as the existence of a
prima facie case on the merits.' The Court in the Vienna Convention Cases,
however, reaffirmed the necessity of proving three criteria.'79 Indeed, at least
two of the three criteria significantly impacted upon the Court's order in fa-
vor of the applicants at the interim protection stage. The Vienna Convention
Cases demonstrate that humanitarian considerations were paramount to the
ICJ when it granted provisional measures in those cases.8 '
175. See Oda, supra note 165, at 554.
176. See D.W. Bowett, et al., The International Court of Justice-Efficiency of Proce-
dures and Working Methods-Report of the Study Group Established by the British Institute of
International and Comparative Law as a Contribution to the UN Decade of International
Law, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. SI (1996); Gavan Griffith, Modernising the General Business of
the International Court of Justice: A Critical Evaluation, 17 Ausm. Y.B. INT'L L. 75 (1996).
177. See Patricia A. Essoff, Comment, Finland v. Denmark: A Call to Clarify the Inter-
national Court of Justice's Standards for Provisional Measures, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 839
n.5 (1991).
178. See id. at 840 (citing Case Concerning Passage Through the Great Belt (Finland v.
Denmark), 1991 I.C.J. 12 (Provisional Measures Order of July 29)).
179. See Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 257, LaGrand, I.C.J. at 14-15.
180. See Legality of the Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 5 (Kreca, J., dissenting) (In-
terim Protection Order of Apr. 28, 1999), International Court of Justice (visited March 6,
2001) <http://www.icj-cij.org> [hereinafter Legality of the Use of Force]. See also the corre-
sponding paragraphs in the Orders of the same date in the several cases collectively referred to
as the Legality of the Use of Force cases. Yugoslavia filed applications requesting the indica-
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1. Jurisdiction
The question of interim measures ordinarily arises before the Court has
determined that it has jurisdiction on the merits. Because of this, the rele-
vance of jurisdiction to an interim protection order has received much
comment and discussion.' It has frequently been stated that interim meas-
ures are part of the Court's incidental jurisdiction and do not derive from
Article 36 of the Statute, which deals with substantive jurisdiction."'2 How-
ever, the issue of substantive jurisdiction is not irrelevant in proceedings for
provisional measures. Commentators note that, given the potentially exact-
ing consequences of provisional measures, the Court cannot ignore the ques-
tion of substantive jurisdiction.' Among recent cases, the most serious con-
sideration was given to jurisdiction in the Application of the Genocide
Convention case, where the issue was complicated by the question of
whether Yugoslavia was a member of the United Nations and therefore a
party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.'" Indeed, the
United States raised the issue of jurisdiction in Breard despite the existence
of a clear treaty obligation in the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Conven-
tion requiring states to submit disputes concerning the interpretation of the
Convention to the ICJ.
The formula most constantly relied upon in recent case law is clearly
articulated in Application of the Genocide Convention:
Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need not, before
deciding whether or not to indicate them, finally satisfy itself that is has ju-
risdiction on the merits of the case, yet it ought not to indicate such meas-
ures unless the provisions invoked by the Applicant or found in the Statute
appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court
might be established... "'
This relatively straightforward test appears to have replaced controver-
sial discussions in earlier cases concerning the need to prove the existence
of jurisdiction before considering a request for provisional measures.8 6 In
tion of provisional measures against ten countries (United States, Belgium, Canada, the Neth-
erlands, Portugal, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain). For practical pur-
poses, except where expressly indicated otherwise, reference is to the documents rendered in
the case between Yugoslavia and the United States, as the documents referred to contain simi-
lar language.
181. See generally Dr. M. H. Mendelson, Interim Measures of Protection in Cases of
Contested Jurisdiction 46 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 259 (1972-73); J.G. Merrills, Interim Measures
of Protection and the Substantive Jurisdiction of the International Court, 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
86(1977).
182. See Mendelson, supra note 181, at 320; Thirlway, supra note 147, at 18.
183. See Merrills, Recent Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, supra note
112, at 92.
184. See Application of the Genocide Convention, 1993 I.C.J. at 12.
185. Id. at 11-12.
186. See, e.g., Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. at 111 (June 22) (Forster, J., dis-
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the Application of the Genocide Convention case, the Court established ju-
risdiction pursuant to the Genocide Convention, and thereby ordered provi-
sional measures to uphold the rights established in the Convention."' How-
ever, the Court did not order provisional measures to protect a number of
other human rights, such as those contained in the Geneva Conventions of
1949, the Additional Protocol I of 1977, the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, and the United Nations Charter.'88 Thus the Order did not pro-
tect rights other than those that were the subject of the dispute. In the Appli-
cation of the Genocide Convention case, the need to demonstrate a prima
facie showing of jurisdiction did not prevent the order of any provisional
measures.'89 The lack of jurisdiction, however, was detrimental to Yugosla-
via's request in the Legality of the Use of Force cases.'" In these cases,
Yugoslavia requested that the Court order NATO countries to immediately
cease their acts of force.' 9' Yugoslavia justified its request on the basis that
the proposed measures would prevent "new losses of human life, further
physical and mental harm inflicted on the population of the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia, further destruction of civilian targets, heavy environ-
mental pollution and further physical destruction of the people of Yugosla-
via."'" Despite evidence of the continued loss of human life, Yugoslavia's
application failed on the basis that it could not demonstrate that the Court
had prima facie jurisdiction over the dispute.'
In the Vienna Convention Cases, the Court based its jurisdiction on the
existence of a dispute between the parties as to whether the relief sought
was available under the Vienna Convention. 9 " The Optional Protocol to the
Vienna Convention, at least in the short term, was instrumental in the appli-
cants' ability to protect life.'9 This can be contrasted to the inability of the
Court to act in the Legality of the Use of Force cases, where more substan-
senting). Judge Forster argued that "[t]o exercise this power conferred by article 41, the Court
must have jurisdiction. Even when it considers that circumstances require the indication of
provisional measures, the Court, before proceeding to indicate them, must satisfy itself that it
has jurisdiction." Id.
187. See Application of the Genocide Convention, 1993 I.C.J. at 4-5.
188. See id. See also Higgins, supra note 137, at 100.
189. See Application of the Genocide Convention, 1993 I.C.J. at 19.
190. See Legality of the Use of Force, supra note 180, 1 5.
191. See id.
192. Id. 17.
193. See id. 128.
194. See Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 256-57; LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. at 18.
195. See Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Concern-
ing the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 241.
Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie
within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may
accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the
dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.
Id. art.1.
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tial losses of life were alleged. 96 A jurisdictional clause in a treaty was also
the basis of the Court's jurisdiction in both the Hostages case 97 and the Ap-
plication of the Genocide Convention case. 9' The requirement of jurisdic-
tion is thus fundamental in determining whether human life threatened by
imminent harm can be protected, whatever the severity of the alleged loss.
2. Irreparable Prejudice
The divergence of views concerning the remedies afforded for a breach
of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention is evident when considering whether
"irreparable prejudice" could be demonstrated by Paraguay and Germany.
The concept of irreparable prejudice appears to be uncertain as to its exact
meaning and its adequacy as a criterion for determining the indication of
provisional measures.' The test articulated by the Court in Fisheries Juris-
diction and repeated in subsequent cases provides that the power under Arti-
cle 41 "presupposes that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights
which are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings."' The most impor-
tant question that must be addressed is what is meant by "irreparable preju-
dice" to a state's rights?"' On one level, damage would only be irreparable
if it could not be adequately compensated for in a final judgment on the
merits.2" For instance, in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, 3 the
Court denied Greece's application for provisional measures on the basis that
"the alleged breach by Turkey of the exclusivity of the right claimed by
Greece to acquire information concerning the natural resources of areas of
continental shelf.., is one that might be capable of reparation by appropri-
196. See Legality of the Use of Force, supra note 180, 128 (Order, June 2, 1999).
197. See Hostages, 1979 I.C.J. at 13-14. The Court based its jurisdiction on the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatice Relations of 1961, and Article I of its accompanying Optional
Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes as well as the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations of 1963, and Article I of its accompanying Optional Protocol con-
cerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. See id.
198. See Application of the Genocide Convention, 1993 I.C.J. at 4.
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application
or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibil-
ity of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III,
shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the
parties to the dispute.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art.
IX, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
199. See SZTUCKI, supra note 101, at 106.
200. (U.K. & N. Ir. v. Ice.) 1972 I.C.J. 12, at 16 (Aug. 17); Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G.
v. Ice.) 1972 I.C.J. 30, at 34 (Aug. 17). See also Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. at 8.
201. See SZTUCKI, supra note 101, at 108; Merrills, Recent Jurisprudence of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, supra note 112, at 108.
202. See Merrills, Recent Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, supra note
112, at 108.
203. (Greece v. Turk.) 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 11).
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ate means on the merits. ' 2" This principle could operate to limit the type of
cases in which provisional measures are available as "there are no violations
of rights which could not be made good in law by a reparation."2 "5 Recent
cases, however, have taken into account whether damage to these rights
would be irreparable in fact as well as at law for the purposes of Article 41
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.'l
"[I]n human rights law, irreparable injury to persons traditionally re-
fers to torture or death."207 But the Statute to the ICJ defines the test in terms
of irreparable prejudice to a state's rights, rather than human rights. This
distinction, however, did not prevent the United States from arguing in the
Hostages case that the loss of individual human life was the ultimate in ir-
reparable injury. 8 The Court endorsed this view when it stated that the con-
tinuation of the hostage situation in the U.S. embassy in Tehran exposed
"the human beings concerned to privation, hardship, anguish and even dan-
ger to life and health and thus to a serious possibility of irreparable harm."2"
In the Legality of the Use of Force cases, the Court again expressed its con-
cern over "the human tragedy, the loss of life, and the enormous suffering in
Kosovo ... and with the continuing loss of life and human suffering in all
parts of Yugoslavia.""21 While the Court denied Yugoslavia's request for
lack of jurisdiction, it simultaneously suggested that "the parties should take
care not to aggravate or extend the dispute" as they would still be responsi-
ble for any actions that violated international law."' Vice-President Weera-
mantry dissented in four of the cases brought by Yugoslavia and suggested
that the Court should have made a wider order, in which the attention of the
parties was directed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
relevant human rights instruments.2 Neither the majority of the Court nor
Vice-President Weeramantry considered whether such a loss of life would
be an irreparable injury to Yugoslavia.
In the Vienna Convention Cases, the question arose whether pecuniary
damages would be an appropriate and adequate remedy for a breach of the
right contained in Article 36, or whether it was necessary to order a stay of
execution to prevent irreparable prejudice. The Court found that the execu-
tion of Breard and LaGrand "would render it impossible for [it] to order the
204. Id. at 11.
205. SzTucKI, supra note 101, at 109.
206. See Merrills, Recent Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, supra note
112, at 108.
207. Pasqualucci, supra note 14, at 842.
208. See Hostages, 1979 I.C.J. at 20.
209. Id.
210. Legality of the Use of Force, supra note 180, 15 (Order, June 2, 1999).
211. Id. (1 31-32.
212. See id. (Vice-President Weeramantry, dissenting in (Yugo. v. Belg.), (Yugo. v.
Can.), (Yugo. v. Neth.), and (Yugo. v. Port.)). See also separate declaration of Vice-President
Weeramantry in (Yugo. v. Fr.), (Yugo. v. F.R.G.), (Yugo. v. Italy), and (Yugo. v. U.K.).
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relief [sought] and thus cause irreparable harm to the rights [claimed]. '
Thus the Court equated the prejudice to a potential remedy (a stay of execu-
tion) with the prejudice to the right granted in Article 36 of the Vienna Con-
vention. While it is clear that execution of LaGrand and Breard would cause
irreparable prejudice to their human rights, it was not so clear that it would
cause irreparable prejudice to any right granted pursuant to Article 36. Con-
sidering the time available, all members of the Court were motivated by
humanitarian concerns when they granted such an order. As Judge Kreca
suggested in his dissenting opinion in the Legality of the Use of Force cases,
when a high degree of humanitarian concern is present, both procedural and
material rules governing the institution of provisional measures have been
brushed aside. 24
3. Urgency
Perhaps of all the requirements for an order of provisional measures,
the level of urgency in Paraguay's and Germany's applications forced the
Court to err on the side of caution when it came to protecting human life.
The need for an applicant state to demonstrate that provisional measures
will only be justified in situations of urgency was spelled out in both or-
ders." 5 Article 74(2) of the Rules of Court highlights the urgency of such re-
quests, stating the Court "shall be convened forthwith" if it is not sitting at
the time the request is made."16 Further, such requests have priority over all
other cases."7 The Court also has the power "to examine proprio motu
whether the circumstances of the case require the indication of provisional
measures."
2' 8
In the Case Concerning the Passage through the Great Belt,219 the Court
defined the requisite urgency as "urgency in the sense that action prejudicial
to the rights of either party is likely to be taken before such final decision is
given.""22 In that case Finland requested interim measures to halt Denmark's
planning of a suspension bridge that would prevent the clear passage of Fin-
nish drill and oil ships through the Great Belt.2 1 The Court found the
planned construction schedule did not justify the indication of provisional
measures, as the proposed timetable did not impose any imminent physical
213. Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 257. See also LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. at 15.
214. See Legality of the Use of Force, supra, note 180 (Kreca, J., dissenting) [ 5 (Order,
June 2, 1999).
215. See Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 257; LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. 14-15.
216. ICJ Rules of Court, supra note 95, art. 74(2).
217. See id. art. 74(1).
218. Id. art. 75(1).
219. (Fin. v. Den.) 1991 I.C.J. 12 (July 29).
220. Id. at 17.
221. See id. at 13.
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hindrance.22 Adjudication on the merits of the case would be completed
prior to any potential obstruction of the waterway, therefore, Finland could
not establish urgency.223
The degree of urgency may also influence when the Court will convene
to hear an application for provisional measures. For instance, in the Case
Concerning the Passage through the Great Belt, a hearing was held forty
days after the request was filed, whereas in the Hostages case the Court
convened ten days after the request was filed.24 In Breard, Paraguay filed its
application and the Court heard argument on the matter four days later,
demonstrating that it can act swiftly when required." In LaGrand, Ger-
many's request for provisional measures stressed the "extreme gravity and
immediacy of the threat" facing the life of its national and thus asked the
Court to treat the matter with the "greatest urgency." '226 With only a day to
spare before the scheduled execution, the Court exercised its power to ex-
amine a situation proprio motu, dispensed with oral hearings, and issued an
order granting the requested provisional measures just one day after Ger-
many filed its request.2 7
In a separate opinion, Judge Schwebel criticized Germany's tactics:
"Germany could have brought its Application years ago, months ago, weeks
ago, or days ago," in which case the Court could have heard argument from
each party.2 Instead, Germany filed its application and request for provi-
sional measures on the "eve of execution," while simultaneously urging the
Court to act proprio motu without hearing argument on behalf of the United
States.29 Despite these reservations, he voted for the substance of the
Court's Order to stay the execution."' The speed in which the Court issued
its order in LaGrand is emphasized by the fact that, to a large extent, it rep-
licates the Order made in Paraguay's earlier application. While the majority
of the Court did not explicitly weigh urgency against other factors, it was
certainly relevant in determining how quickly the Court acted.
The speed in which the Court acted in the Vienna Convention Cases
is arguably a positive development with respect to protecting human life. As
Jo M. Pasqualucci notes, "a time-consuming approach to justice is inade-
quate in... situations that may result in death or torture."3 ' The matter of
days the Court took to grant orders in the Vienna Convention Cases, how-
222. See id. at 18.
223. See id.
224. See Thirlway, supra note 147, at 26.
225. See International Court of Justice, <http://www.icj-cij.org> (Application of Para-
guay, supra note 10; Paraguay Interim Protection Order of Apr. 9).
226. Request of Germany, supra note 151, 9.
227. See International Court of Justice, <http://www.icj-cij.org> (LaGrand, Interim Pro-
tection Order of Mar. 3, 1999).
228. LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. at 22 (separate opinion of Judge Schwebel).
229. Id.
230. See id.
231. Pascqualucci, supra note 14, at 806.
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ever, has been compared to the month-long deliberation of the applications
for provisional measures in the Legality of the Use of Force cases.232 Judge
Vereshchetin emphasized that the extraordinary circumstances of these
cases required the Court to act quickly and declare its concern over the
"human misery, loss of life and serious violations of international law" that
occurred. 33 Certainly the Legality of the Use of Force cases involved loss of
life on a much larger scale than that presented in the Vienna Convention
Cases. While Yugoslavia pointed out the urgency of the threat to human
lives, the Court did not feel pressed to act with the same speed as it did in
the Vienna Convention Cases. Given the complicated questions of jurisdic-
tion involved in the Legality of the Use of Force cases, it is not surprising
the Court took time to deliberate. These latter cases do indicate, however,
that the potential loss of life alone does not motivate the Court to act
quickly. Requesting provisional measures is therefore not always the appro-
priate method of protect life in a situation of urgency.
IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF USING INTERIM MEASURES AS A MEANS OF
PROTECTING LIFE
The outcome of the Vienna Convention Cases exposes numerous diffi-
culties in using applications for provisional measures as a means of protect-
ing human life. First, the result reveals the lack of the ICJ's enforcement
power in relation to both its provisional measures orders and final judg-
ments."M The possibility of Security Council action to enforce an ICJ judg-
ment is an empty threat when the respondent is a member of the "Permanent
Five.""23 This is particularly the case given that in her letter to the governor
of Virginia, Madeleine describes the ICJ's order as "non-binding."236 Opti-
232. See Legality of the Use of Force, supra note 180 (declaration of Judge
Vereshchetin).
233. Id.
234. U.N. CHARTER art. 94 provides that:
Each member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a
judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security
Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
Article 94(2) refers to judgments rather than orders, which suggests that there is some dispute
as to the extent to which article 94 encompasses orders for provisional measures. Compare
Thirlway, supra note 147, at 30 with Michael K. Addo, Interim Measures of Protection for
Rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 713, 724
(1999) [hereinafter Addo, Interim Measures].
235. The Permanent Five refers to the 5 permanent members of the U.N. Security Coun-
cil (U.S., France, U.K., China, and Russia).
236. Addo, Interim Measures, supra note 234, at 727 (citing Letter from Madeleine K.
Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, to James Gilmore III, Governor of Virginia (Apr. 13,
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mistically, some scholars have suggested this "must not be interpreted to
suggest that the order was not legally binding per se but should rather be
seen as a reflection of its broad character, leaving room for the United States
to take the necessary action to comply with it. 237 This question of whether
provisional measures are binding as a matter of treaty law or as a general
principle of international law has been discussed by a number of commenta-
tors.238 Sztucki concludes that the Court's orders do not indicate that interim
measures are formally binding at law.239 Louis Henkin, however, in a discus-
sion of the outcome of Breard, described U.S. Department of State's charac-
terization of the Court's language in the order as non-binding "regretta-
ble."2" In his view the order was legally binding, and the United States was
required to take the measures indicated in the Court's order."' Additional
legal scholarship has also suggested that the United States administration's
position regarding the "nonbinding quality" of the order is "unconvincing"
considering "in international law the consequences of non-compliance with
binding norms do not differ nearly as much as they do in domestic law from
the consequences of noncompliance with nonbinding norms."'' The United
States' position is at odds with its own behavior in the Hostages case, where
it insisted on Iran's compliance with the ICJ's decision.2"3 Regardless of the
result of such a debate, the fact that doubts are expressed about the binding
nature of provisional measures orders in the ICJ ensures that such applica-
tions are an uncertain method of protecting human life.
Second, the outcome of the Vienna Convention Cases serves to focus
attention on the "abysmal record of compliance" with orders for provisional
measures.2" This is another reason to doubt the efficacy of requests for pro-
visional measures in situations where the result of non-compliance is irre-
versible. Michael K. Addo has noted that, given the "credibility gap" dem-
onstrated by state practice in this respect, it may be better to "speed up
proceedings in which provisional measures have been ordered."2 5 An alter-
1998)).
237. Id. at 726-27.
238. See Thirlway, supra note 147, at 28-33; SzTucri, supra note 101, at 260-302;
ELKIND, supra note 12, at 153-64.
239. See SzTucri, supra note 101, at 273-75.
240. Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and the States, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 679, 683 (1998).
241. See id. at 680.
242. Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance
with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683, 686 (1998).
243. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Judicial Authority to Give Effect to ICJ Provisional
Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 697, 703 (1998). See also Statement Amicus Curiae of Interna-
tional Law Professors in Support of Petitioners' Supplemental Application for Stay of or In-
junction Against Execution, Paraguay v. Gilmore, 523 U.S. 1068 (1998).
244. Addo, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 125, at 680. "In the ten
cases in which provisional measures were ordered, only in two of them can one confidently
say that they have been complied with fully." Id. & n.41.
245. Id. at 681. "The gap that currently exists between incidental proceedings and the
30
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 31, No. 1 [2000], Art. 24
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol31/iss1/24
2000] SAVING LIVES IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 171
native would be to hear valid substantive arguments prior to the merits stage
of the proceedings."6 While these suggestions may pose solutions in situa-
tions where the loss of life is not profoundly imminent, it does not aid the
Court in situations where it has but one day to make a decision, as in La-
Grand. The lack of compliance with the Order in Breard is due to the gov-
ernor of Virginia's failure to enforce the international legal obligations of
the United States, thus demonstrating the problems of implementing inter-
national law in a federal system. Although this fact does not excuse the
United States from the performance of its obligations, it demonstrates that
individuals are particularly vulnerable where their fate is in the hands of a
state within a federal system and that state does not wish to implement the
nation's international obligations. The governor of Virginia's action in al-
lowing Breard's execution to proceed was condemned by human rights or-
ganizations,247 yet this did not prevent LaGrand from undergoing a similar
fate in Arizona.
Third, the result in the Vienna Convention Cases demonstrates that, as a
states' court, the ICJ is not the most effective forum for dealing with the
rights of individuals under immediate threat. As stated in both Vienna Con-
vention Cases, the ICJ is not a court of criminal appeal24 and is therefore an
inappropriate forum for the consideration of the decisions of United States
courts. Furthermore, it is not a court established to protect human rights. In
the Application of the Genocide Convention case, the Court refused to order
measures that would safeguard human rights not protected by the Genocide
Convention,249 yet in the Vienna Convention Cases, the Court stayed two
executions to ensure Paraguay and Germany's requested remedies would be
available in the future. While the Court certainly had prima facie jurisdic-
tion pursuant to the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, it is not
clear whether the Convention actually protected individual rights. Judge
Rosalyn Higgins commented that orders for provisional measures in cases
such as the Application of the Genocide Convention Case, the Hostages
case, the Frontier Dispute, and the Land and Maritime Boundary Between
Nigeria and Cameroon, indicate the Court's "tendency to recognize the hu-
merits stage is sufficiently excessive to generate a sense of injustice in the minds of some liti-
gants." Id.
246. See id. at 680.
247. See Amnesty International, The Execution of Angel Breard: Apologies Are Not
Enough, (visited Feb. 12, 2001) <http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1998/SUM5102798.
htm>; Allyson Collins, Senior Researcher Human Rights Watch, Letter to Governor of Ari-
zona regarding Karl and Walter LaGrand, dated 23 February 1999 (last modified Jan. 2001)
<http://www.hrw.orglhrwlpress/1999/marlexeltr.htm>.
248. See Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 257; LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. at 15.
249. See Application of the Genocide Convention, 1993 I.C.J. at 19. The Court based its
jurisdiction on the Convention and, therefore, "confine[d] its examination of the measures re-
quested, and of the grounds asserted for the request for such measures, to those which fall
within the scope of the Genocide Convention." Id.
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man realities behind disputes [between] states."2" While the Court's devel-
oping jurisprudence in this area should be applauded, the failure of states to
abide by the Court's orders when individual rights are directly in issue is
troublesome. The Court's inability to deal with the recent Legality of the
Use of Force cases, despite allegations of substantial loss of life, demon-
strates that the most obvious limitation upon the Court is the constraint of
jurisdiction. This limitation operates to ensure that the Court is not the most
appropriate avenue for developing consistent jurisprudence on provisional
measures applications involving human rights.
To enable the ICJ to be more responsive to the claims of individuals
under international law, commentators advocate enlarging the Court's juris-
diction to accommodate applications from individuals or international or-
ganizations. Mark W. Janis has pointed to the European human rights sys-
tem, which provides individuals with a right of individual petition, to
support his argument that opening up the ICJ's jurisdiction is perhaps the
only method of ensuring the ICJ's effective utilization. 25 While it is
unlikely that such reform will take place in the near future, there are other
international fora established with the specific aim of protecting human
rights that allow urgent applications to be heard. When considering commu-
nications received under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee permits the UN Com-
mittee to inform states subject to the individual communication procedure
"of its views as to whether interim measures may be desirable to avoid ir-
reparable damage to the victim of the alleged violation." '252 Rule 86 has been
described as "an immensely valuable tool, which.., could prove a formida-
ble weapon in the task of deterring a State Party from taking further punitive
measures, once an author has already lodged a communication and is thus in
a particularly vulnerable position."253 The Human Rights Committee has
used its Rule 86 power to request stays of execution in death penalty cases
from Caribbean state parties to the Optional Protocol such as Trinidad and
Tobago. The procedure suffers, however, from the defect that it is not bind-
ing upon state parties." Thus, while some states have granted stays when
requested by the Committee,2 other states have failed to comply with such
250. Higgins, supra note 137, at 103.
251. See Mark W. Janis, Individuals and the International Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE-ITs FUTURE ROLE AFTER FIFrY YEARS 205, 209 (A.S. Muller, et al. eds.,
1997). Janis refers to the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the European
Court of Human Rights. Id.
252. Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, Rule 86, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/3/Rev.3 (1994).
253. P.R. GHANDHI, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTrEE AND THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL
COMMUNICATION-LAW AND PRACTICE 57-58 (1998).
254. See id. at 57.
255. See Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, Communication No. 210/1996 and 225/1987(1989), cited in Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 222, U.N. Doc. No. A/44/40 (1989).
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requests and carried out death sentences on those who have filed communi-
cations alleging a violation of their human rights."6 A more chilling devel-
opment in this regard has been Trinidad and Tobago's denunciation and re-
accession to the Optional Protocol with a reservation that removed the abil-
ity of the Human Rights Committee to consider communications relating to
death row inmates. 7 In November 1999, the Human Rights Committee
found this reservation to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Optional Protocol, and thus decided that a communication concerning a
death row prisoner from Trinidad and Tobago was admissible. 8 Trinidad
and Tobago have responded to this decision by again denouncing the Op-
tional Protocol, thus removing the ability of the Human Rights Committee
to hear any individual complaint from that country.259
Requests for provisional measures may also be made in the Inter-
American and European human rights systems. In a provision that closely
mirrors Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and the
criteria articulated by the ICJ, the American Convention on Human Rights
provides that:
In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid ir-
reparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional meas-
ures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under consideration. With re-
spect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the request of
the Commission.
256. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. 1, [ 411, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994).
257. Trinidad and Tobago re-acceded to the Optional Protocol but with a reservation,
which provided (in part) that:
Trinidad and Tobago re-accedes to the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with a Reservation to article 1 thereof to the
effect that the Human Rights Committee shall not be competent to receive and con-
sider communications relating to any prisoner who is under sentence of death in re-
spect of any matter relating to his prosecution, his detention, his trial, his convic-
tion, his sentence or the carrying out of the death sentence on him and any matter
connected therewith.
Declarations and Reservations, as of 8 August 2000, to the Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ menu3/b/treaty
6_asp.htm>.
258. See Decision of the Human Rights Committee Under the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 67th
Sess., Annex, 17, U.N. Doc. No. CCPRICI671D84511999 (1999).
259. See Notice to Denounce the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trinidad and Tobago, Mar. 27, 2000, noted
in Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 55th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, vol. 1, U.N. Doc. A/55140 (2000).
260. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 63(2), 9 I.L.M. 673
(1970) (entered into force July 18, 1978).
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The President of the Court is also authorized to call upon states to adopt
emergency provisional measures when the Court is not in session.26' The
Commission has requested that the Court adopt provisional measures in
cases where human life has been under threat.262 In contrast to the Inter-
American system, there is no formal article in the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that enables the European Court
on Human Rights to adopt provisional measures. The Rules of Procedure,
however, have incorporated such a provision.263 As these rules are not in-
cluded in the European Convention, they are merely procedural and there-
fore not binding on the parties.2' The feature that distinguishes provisional
measures applied by all three human rights institutions from Article 41 of
the Statute of the ICJ is that they are designed to prevent irreparable damage
to the rights of persons rather than of states. Thus they offer a more direct
and effective method of dealing with the irreparable prejudice that an indi-
vidual may suffer without relying on diplomatic protection or a finding that
the rights of a state are also affected. These procedures, however, were not
available to Breard or LaGrand because the United States is not subject to
the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee pursuant to the Optional
Protocol or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
V. CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that the outcome of the orders in the Vienna Conven-
tion Cases, which generated a great deal of public attention, was not more
constructive. The orders have nonetheless had some positive effects on the
jurisprudence of the Court. In the context of the Vienna Convention Cases,
scholars have stated that,
261. See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art. 25(4)
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1997), Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-
American System, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 163, OEA/ser. L.N./I.4, doc. rev. 7 (2000).
262. See Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights August 8, 1990, Provi-
sional Measures Requested by Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Regarding Peru
(Bustios-Rojas Case) (last visited Mar. 19, 2001) <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/
b1 12a.htm>. See also Thomas Buergenthal, Interim Measures in the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, in INTERIM MEASURES INDICATED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS, supra, note 247,
at 69, 69.
263. Rule 39(1) provides:
The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President may, at the request of a party or
of any other person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the parties any in-
terim measure which it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or
of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it.
European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court (entered into force Nov. 1, 1998) (visited
March 6, 2001) <http://www.echr.coe.int>.
264. See Cruz Varas v. Sweden, App. No. 15576189, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35
(1991).
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[w]here the rights of States and those of individuals are inseparable, it
would be unwise for the Court to remain inflexible by seeking to address
only the rights of States. This would prove unworkable in practice. Interna-
tional human rights law.., provides the essential link in international law
between the State and the individual, the ultimate bottom line in any legal
order.' 6
The orders in these two cases demonstrate that the ICJ can respond to
human rights under imminent threat, particularly when the most important
right, the right to life, is at issue. The efficacy of the Court's ability to pro-
tect individual human life can, however, be questioned in light of the execu-
tion of both LaGrand and Breard despite the ICJ's orders to the contrary.
While delay in implementing an interim protection order may not always
result in a state's inability to obtain a remedy under international law, the
failure to fulfill an order is irreversible where human life is at stake. Despite
the limitations of invoking Article 41 for this purpose, the applications by
Paraguay and Germany demonstrate that states are turning to the ICJ to pro-
tect human rights, particularly where the Court can assume jurisdiction on
the basis of a jurisdictional clause in a treaty. This is, perhaps, not a surpris-
ing trend considering many states are not subject to the individual complaint
procedures of the international and regional human rights institutions. It can
thus be expected that use of Article 41 to protect human rights under threat
of irreparable harm will continue in the future.
It is true that as provisional measures orders are prepared under consid-
erable time pressure, "the text of such Orders should not be put under the
magnifying glass on the assumption that every word has been weighed with
the scholarly care which you might employ if you were writing a paper.""
The extreme time constraints under which the Court prepared its orders in
the Vienna Convention Cases certainly adds weight to this comment. If the
Court is to retain a credible role in protecting human rights through the im-
plementation of Article 41, however, it needs to clarify the purposes and re-
quirements for a grant of provisional measures in the context of threats to
persons rather than to a state. From the Court's jurisprudence it appears that
a state may utilize diplomatic protection to protect the lives of its nationals,
and that protection may be afforded where the rights of a state are also un-
der threat or where internationally protected rights are involved. The Vienna
Convention Cases are unusual in that the Court ordered Breard's and La-
Grand's lives be temporarily spared without an explicit binding treaty provi-
sion protecting their right to life. The two orders leave unanswered whether
the Court will discuss the suitability of a stay of execution and new trial as
remedies for a breach of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on the merits
of Germany's case.
265. Addo, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 125, at 680.
266. Thirlway, supra note 147, at 6.
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Only future cases will determine whether the Court will expand its rul-
ings in this area. For instance, is it possible for a state to invoke Article 41
to protect human rights where the violation of an erga omnes obligation is
alleged? Will the Court be able to demonstrate the link between the alleged
breach and the threat to the rights of a state party for the purposes of Article
41 in such a case? Additionally, the possibility that states may attempt to
utilize Article 41 remains where other human rights, apart from the right to
life, are endangered. Such an expansion will depend on whether the Court
can assume jurisdiction, and whether a state can demonstrate irreparable
prejudice and urgency. Without an amendment to Article 41, these questions
remain for future determination by the Court itself. Judge Oda's concern
that the Court should not depart from its principal function as a court de-
signed to settle inter-state disputes must be weighed against scholarly com-
ment that the ICJ would be unwise to ignore the link between the rights of
states and those of individuals. At present it would appear that the current
limitations in implementing the Court's orders combined with the problems
in enforcing international human rights law, tell against the use of the provi-
sional measures procedure in the ICJ as a practical method of protecting
human life.
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